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Diversionary Escalation: Theory and Evidence from Eastern Ukraine

Author

Listed:
  • Natalie Ayers

    (Harvard University)

  • Christopher Blair

    (Princeton University)

  • Joseph Ruggiero

    (University of Virginia)

  • Austin Wright

    (University of Chicago)

  • Konstantin Sonin

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

When leaders face threats to their authority, escalating foreign conflict can help divert public attention away from domestic grievances. We develop a formal microfoundation for diversionary escalation rooted in a theory of regime change. Although the idea of diversionary escalation is classic, systematic quantitative evidence has been challenging to obtain. Using a new data set of 1.8 million conflict incidents, obtained from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in 2015–2022, we find evidence that the Russian government strategically employed proxy-initiated separatist violence in Eastern Ukraine to divert attention from domestic unrest and opposition-led protest. We also find a positive link between opposition protest and inflammatory anti-Ukrainian coverage in the Russian media, complementary to battlefield escalation.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalie Ayers & Christopher Blair & Joseph Ruggiero & Austin Wright & Konstantin Sonin, 2026. "Diversionary Escalation: Theory and Evidence from Eastern Ukraine," Working Papers 2026-21, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2026-21
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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