Collusion and Durability
We make the observation that cartels which produce goods with lower durability are easier to sustain implicitly. This observation generates the following results: 1) implicit cartels have an incentive to produce goods with an inefficiently low level of durability; 2) a monopoly or explicit cartel is welfare superior to an implicit cartel; 3) welfare is non--monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion.
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- Jeremy Bulow, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 729-749.
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- Faruk Gul, 1987. "Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 248-254, Summer.
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