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Political salience and regime resilience

Author

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  • Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
  • Steffen Huck
  • Macartan Humphreys

Abstract

We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents’ expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive concerns with material bandwagoning incentives, and we show that comparative statics in salience characterize stability. As main insight, when regime sanctions are weak, increases from low to middling salience can pose the greatest threat to regimes – ever smaller shocks suffice to drastically escalate attacks. Our results speak to the charged debates about democracy, by identifying conditions under which heightened interest in political decision-making can pose a threat to democracy in and of itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Steffen Huck & Macartan Humphreys, 2023. "Political salience and regime resilience," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0031, Berlin School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0031
    DOI: 10.48462/opus4-5208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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