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The effect of organized crime on public funds

Author

Listed:
  • Guglielmo Barone

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Gaia Narciso

    (Trinity College Dublin)

Abstract

Organized crime is widely regarded as damaging to the economy, to say nothing of people�s lives. Yet little is known about the mechanism at work. This paper helps fill the gap by analyzing the impact of organized crime on the allocation of public subsidies to businesses. We assemble an innovative data set on Italian mafia crimes at municipal level and test whether organized crime diverts public funding. We exploit exogenous variations at the level of municipalities to instrument current mafia-style activity by using exogenous shifters of land productivity in the 19th century. Our results show that the presence of organized crime positively affects both the extensive margin (probability of funding) and the intensive margin (amount of public funding to enterprises). The impact is economically relevant and equal to at least one standard deviation of the dependent variable. Organized crime is also found to cause episodes of corruption in the public administration. A series of robustness checks confirm the findings. Our results suggest that geographically targeted aid policies should be careful to take local crime conditions into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Guglielmo Barone & Gaia Narciso, 2013. "The effect of organized crime on public funds," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 916, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_916_13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    3. Giacomo Di Gennaro & Antonio La Spina, 2016. "The costs of illegality: a research programme," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 1-20, January.
    4. Naddeo, Andreina, 2014. "How crime affects the economy: evidence from Italy," MPRA Paper 65419, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ilaria De Angelis & Guido de Blasio & Lucia Rizzica, 2018. "On the unintended effects of public transfers: evidence from EU funding to Southern Italy," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1180, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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    7. Scognamiglio, Annalisa, 2018. "When the mafia comes to town," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 573-590.
    8. Sara Formai, 2013. "Heterogenous firms and credit frictions: a general equilibrium analysis of market entry decisions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 940, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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