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On the 'conquest' of inflation

Author

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  • Andrea Gerali

    (Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department)

  • Francesco Lippi

    (Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department)

Abstract

Sargent (1999) warns that if policymakers� views on the unemployment - inflation tradeoff are driven by empirical correlations rather than theory, disinflations (escapes from high to low inflation) may periodically occurr but are not bound to last. This paper asks how different inflation objectives on the part of the policymaker affect this result. We show that escapes in the neighborhood of zero inflation are less frequent and have a shorter duration as policy objectives become more inflation-averse. A sufficiently (but not infinitely) inflationaverse policymaker never escapes Nash inflation and, on average, yields a lower inflation rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Gerali & Francesco Lippi, 2002. "On the 'conquest' of inflation," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 444, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_444_02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alex Cukierman, 1998. "The Economics of Central Banking," International Economic Association Series, in: Holger C. Wolf (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 3, pages 37-82, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    3. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "A framework for monetary stability," Other publications TiSEM 6adcf349-d5d0-4591-9e95-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    6. Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2009. "The Conquest of South American Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 211-256, April.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Angelini & Paolo Del Giovane & Stefano Siviero & Daniele Terlizzese, 2002. "Monetary Policy Rules for the Euro Area: What Role for National Information?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 457, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Robert Tetlow & Peter von zur Muehlen, 2004. "Avoiding Nash Inflation: Bayesian and Robus Responses to Model Uncertainty," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 869-899, October.
    3. Martin Ellison & Liam Graham & Jouko Vilmunen, 2006. "Strong Contagion with Weak Spillovers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 263-283, April.
    4. Berardi, Michele, 2013. "Escape Dynamics And Policy Specification," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 123-142, January.
    5. Yates, Anthony & Ellison, Martin, 2007. "Escaping Nash and Volatile Inflation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6483, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Francesco Columba, 2003. "Transaction Technology Innovation and Demand for Overnight Deposits in Italy," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 468, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation bias; disinflation; learning; conservative bankers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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