To Tokenize, or Not to Tokenize: The Design Question for a Central Bank Digital Currency

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to assess central bank digital currency (CBDC) design in a monetary system where traditional banks and “crypto banks” (i.e., banks that issue stablecoins) coexist. We compare tokenized and non-tokenized CBDC, showing that their desirability depends on the reliability of private money provision, the availability of collateral assets and the features of the crypto sector. Crucially, we show that the tokenization decision of CBDC matters for the equilibrium outcomes only when collateral use differs across sectors, identifying conditions under which tokenization is necessary to improve welfare. Tokenized CBDC can crowd out stablecoins and improve efficiency when crypto banks are not that trustworthy and crypto assets are scarce. Non-tokenized CBDC may be preferred when crypto transactions are less desirable or when reallocating reserves from traditional to crypto banks is beneficial. Our results highlight a trade-off between gains in payment efficiency and potential reductions in bank lending. These findings offer new policy insights on CBDC design under evolving financial conditions.