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Democratic Backsliding and Recovery

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Chong

    (Georgia State University and Universidad del Pacifico)

  • Mark Gradstein

    (Ben Gurion University, CEPR, CESifo, and IZA)

Abstract

Why does democratic backsliding often reverse rather than culminate in durable autocracy? Using V-Dem data for 202 countries over 1900-2024, this paper shows that the apparent durability advantage of autocracy largely disappears once historical composition is taken into account. It further shows that political polarization disproportionately destabilizes democracies relative to autocracies. Event-study evidence indicates that polarization rises before democratic collapse and declines following democratization. A simple political-economy framework rationalizes these patterns through endogenous demand for centralized authority under democratic instability and subsequent backlash against concentrated power.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2026. "Democratic Backsliding and Recovery," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2618, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2618
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    References listed on IDEAS

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