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Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach

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Abstract

Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Casari & Simon J. Wilkie, 2004. "Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 587.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:587.03
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    1. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleffner, Anne E, 1992. "Should Earthquake Mitigation Measures Be Voluntary or Required?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 321-333, December.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
    3. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, 2003. "The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(3), pages 496-509, July.
    4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    5. (Noel) Bryson, Kweku-Muata & Millar, Harvey & Joseph, Anito & Mobolurin, Ayodele, 2002. "Using formal MS/OR modeling to support disaster recovery planning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 679-688, September.
    6. Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "Disaster and Recovery," UCLA Economics Working Papers 639, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nabil Touili, 2021. "Hazards, Infrastructure Networks and Unspecific Resilience," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-16, April.
    2. Zio, Enrico, 2016. "Challenges in the vulnerability and risk analysis of critical infrastructures," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 137-150.
    3. Timothy Matisziw & Alan Murray & Tony Grubesic, 2010. "Strategic Network Restoration," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 345-361, September.
    4. Fang, Yi-Ping & Sansavini, Giovanni, 2019. "Optimum post-disruption restoration under uncertainty for enhancing critical infrastructure resilience," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 1-11.
    5. Zio, E., 2018. "The future of risk assessment," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 176-190.
    6. Alkhaleel, Basem A. & Liao, Haitao & Sullivan, Kelly M., 2022. "Risk and resilience-based optimal post-disruption restoration for critical infrastructures under uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(1), pages 174-202.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    utilities; inter-temporal decisions; natural disasters; mechanism design; network externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

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