No Welfare Ties Between Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria

We show that distinct pure-strategy Nash equilibria typically have different utilitarian welfare values in sufficiently rich classes of $C^2$ games with open strategy sets. Here, typical means both generic and finitely prevalent, while rich means that the class admits a finite-dimensional family of perturbations that can independently move payoff values and first derivatives in any direction at any two distinct strategy profiles (for example, polynomial perturbations of degree at most three). Consequently, a welfare-maximizing equilibrium, if one exists, is unique. The result extends to each fixed $C^1$ payoff aggregator whose derivative with respect to the payoff vector is everywhere nonzero. In the full $C^2$ utility space, we also treat scalar criteria depending on strategies, payoffs, and payoff derivatives, subject to a nonvanishing condition in payoff-level or cross-player derivative directions. Finally, adjoining arbitrarily small perturbations from a suitable finite-dimensional space makes welfare separation typical in the augmented family, with separation holding for almost every perturbation of each fixed base game.