IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2608.05969.html

The Institutional Window: Occupation- and Jurisdiction-Specific Calibration of Liability Signaling for Preserved Human Fallback Capability

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Bauer

Abstract

Generative AI makes expert output uninformative about the human fallback capability its provider keeps in reserve. A liability commitment can signal that capability: a provider whose staff rescue more of the cases the AI fails pays damages less often, so the commitment certifies an asset built by keeping people on cases and lost by taking them off. This paper asks where contract law leaves room for such a signal. Four legal primitives map a posted cap into retained exposure and close the message space from both sides: litigation viability, the penalty doctrine, displacement of liability to the state or an indemnity pool, and mandatory control of standard terms. Where the law leaves an option of zero exposure, low types pool at zero, intermediate types separate on a schedule anchored at the mandatory floor, and high types pool at the ceiling; where it does not, separation starts at the bottom type. A statutory floor removes the lower pool but pushes the schedule toward the ceiling, so its net effect is not monotone. The penalty doctrine decides whether recovery adequate for deterrence can be restored by contract or only by investing in verifiability. Holding fallback skill constant demands more human engagement the less often the AI fails. A calibration to five occupations and twelve legal configurations in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States locates the binding margin of each cell and supports no ranking by legal family or contracting channel.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Bauer, 2026. "The Institutional Window: Occupation- and Jurisdiction-Specific Calibration of Liability Signaling for Preserved Human Fallback Capability," Papers 2608.05969, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.05969
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.05969
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert A. Shumsky & Edieal J. Pinker, 2003. "Gatekeepers and Referrals in Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(7), pages 839-856, July.
    2. Sang-Hyun Kim & Morris A. Cohen & Serguei Netessine, 2007. "Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(12), pages 1843-1858, December.
    3. Tom Fangyun Tan & Serguei Netessine, 2014. "When Does the Devil Make Work? An Empirical Study of the Impact of Workload on Worker Productivity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(6), pages 1574-1593, June.
    4. C. Lanier Benkard, 2000. "Learning and Forgetting: The Dynamics of Aircraft Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    5. Andreas Bauer, 2026. "The Fallback as Signal: Preserved Human Skill, Liability, and Competence Signaling in Credence-Good Markets under Improving AI," Papers 2608.04276, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2026.
    6. Varun Magesh & Faiz Surani & Matthew Dahl & Mirac Suzgun & Christopher D. Manning & Daniel E. Ho, 2025. "Hallucination‐Free? Assessing the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(2), pages 216-242, June.
    7. Nancy A. Lutz, 1989. "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 239-255, Summer.
    8. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 526-555, April.
    9. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 2003. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 45-63, April.
    10. Esther Gal-Or, 1989. "Warranties as a Signal of Quality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 50-61, February.
    11. Paul Windrum & Giorgio Fagiolo & Alessio Moneta, 2007. "Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models: Alternatives and Prospects," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8.
    12. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    13. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2006. "On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 5-42, March.
    14. Simrita Singh & Naireet Ghosh & Tinglong Dai, 2026. "Managing the Human Fallback: Skill Investment Under Improving AI and Worker Mobility," Papers 2606.29111, arXiv.org.
    15. Sridhar Moorthy & Kannan Srinivasan, 1995. "Signaling Quality with a Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 442-466.
    16. Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "Incomplete Contracts and Signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 432-443, Autumn.
    17. Tamer Boyacı & Caner Canyakmaz & Francis de Véricourt, 2024. "Human and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision Making Under Cognitive Limitations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(2), pages 1258-1275, February.
    18. Laurens G. Debo & L. Beril Toktay & Luk N. Van Wassenhove, 2008. "Queuing for Expert Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(8), pages 1497-1512, August.
    19. Erik Brynjolfsson & Danielle Li & Lindsey Raymond, 2025. "Generative AI at Work," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 140(2), pages 889-942.
    20. Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
    21. Alessandro Arlotto & Stephen E. Chick & Noah Gans, 2014. "Optimal Hiring and Retention Policies for Heterogeneous Workers Who Learn," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 110-129, January.
    22. Diwas KC & Bradley R. Staats & Francesca Gino, 2013. "Learning from My Success and from Others' Failure: Evidence from Minimally Invasive Cardiac Surgery," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2435-2449, November.
    23. Andreas Bauer, 2026. "The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services," Papers 2607.26327, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2026.
    24. Linda Argote & Sara L. Beckman & Dennis Epple, 1990. "The Persistence and Transfer of Learning in Industrial Settings," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(2), pages 140-154, February.
    25. Noah Gans & Yong-Pin Zhou, 2002. "Managing Learning and Turnover in Employee Staffing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(6), pages 991-1006, December.
    26. Senthil K. Veeraraghavan & Laurens G. Debo, 2011. "Herding in Queues with Waiting Costs: Rationality and Regret," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 329-346, July.
    27. Krishnan S. Anand & M. Faz{i}l Paç & Senthil Veeraraghavan, 2011. "Quality-Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 40-56, January.
    28. Tinglong Dai & Sridhar Tayur, 2022. "Designing AI‐augmented healthcare delivery systems for physician buy‐in and patient acceptance," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(12), pages 4443-4451, December.
    29. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter.
    30. Daniel Harenberg & Stefano Marelli & Bruno Sudret & Viktor Winschel, 2019. "Uncertainty quantification and global sensitivity analysis for economic models," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, January.
    31. Bradley R. Staats & Francesca Gino, 2012. "Specialization and Variety in Repetitive Tasks: Evidence from a Japanese Bank," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1141-1159, June.
    32. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
    33. Nancy A. Lutz & V. Padmanabhan, 1995. "Why Do We Observe Minimal Warranties?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 417-441.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Diwas S. KC & Bradley R. Staats & Maryam Kouchaki & Francesca Gino, 2020. "Task Selection and Workload: A Focus on Completing Easy Tasks Hurts Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4397-4416, October.
    2. Andreas Bauer, 2026. "The Fallback as Signal: Preserved Human Skill, Liability, and Competence Signaling in Credence-Good Markets under Improving AI," Papers 2608.04276, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2026.
    3. Michael Freeman & Nicos Savva & Stefan Scholtes, 2017. "Gatekeepers at Work: An Empirical Analysis of a Maternity Unit," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(10), pages 3147-3167, October.
    4. Bo Jiang & Xubing Zhang, 2011. "How Does a Retailer's Service Plan Affect a Manufacturer's Warranty?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 727-740, April.
    5. Junhong Chu & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 2009. "Quantifying the Economic Value of Warranties in the U.S. Server Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 99-121, 01-02.
    6. Tom Fangyun Tan & Serguei Netessine, 2014. "When Does the Devil Make Work? An Empirical Study of the Impact of Workload on Worker Productivity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(6), pages 1574-1593, June.
    7. Linda Argote & Sunkee Lee & Jisoo Park, 2021. "Organizational Learning Processes and Outcomes: Major Findings and Future Research Directions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5399-5429, September.
    8. Subramanian Balachander, 2001. "Warranty Signalling and Reputation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(9), pages 1282-1289, September.
    9. Sawoong Kang, 2006. "Return Policy as a Signaling Device in Horizontally Differentiated Products," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 22, pages 409-436.
    10. Glauber, Johanna & Kretschmer, Tobias, 2018. "Learning from failure across products," CEPR Discussion Papers 13140, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    11. Bradley R. Staats & Diwas S. KC & Francesca Gino, 2018. "Maintaining Beliefs in the Face of Negative News: The Moderating Role of Experience," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 804-824, February.
    12. Maria R. Ibanez & Jonathan R. Clark & Robert S. Huckman & Bradley R. Staats, 2018. "Discretionary Task Ordering: Queue Management in Radiological Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4389-4407, September.
    13. Nitin Bakshi & Sang-Hyun Kim & Nicos Savva, 2015. "Signaling New Product Reliability with After-Sales Service Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(8), pages 1812-1829, August.
    14. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 973-989, December.
    15. F. S. Zijlstra & A. A. Alblas & F. Langerak, 2024. "Cross-Site and Cross-Generation Knowledge Transfer in High-Tech After-Sales Service," Service Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(3), pages 155-171, September.
    16. Tat Y. Chan & Jia Li & Lamar Pierce, 2014. "Learning from Peers: Knowledge Transfer and Sales Force Productivity Growth," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 463-484, July.
    17. Delasay, Mohammad & Ingolfsson, Armann & Kolfal, Bora & Schultz, Kenneth, 2019. "Load effect on service times," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 673-686.
    18. Ammar Y. Alqahtani & Surendra M. Gupta, 2017. "One-Dimensional Renewable Warranty Management within Sustainable Supply Chain," Resources, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-26, April.
    19. Anne‐Célia Disdier & Carl Gaigné & Cristina Herghelegiu, 2023. "Do standards improve the quality of traded products?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1238-1290, November.
    20. Vidya Mani & Suresh Muthulingam, 2019. "Does Learning from Inspections Affect Environmental Performance? Evidence from Unconventional Well Development in Pennsylvania," Service Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 177-197, January.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.05969. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.