IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2607.26327.html

The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Bauer

Abstract

Generative artificial intelligence has reduced the cost of producing convincing artifacts of expertise-reports, analyses, proposals-to nearly zero. Signaling theory predicts that signals whose content rests on production cost lose it when production becomes cheap. We formalize this for expert services, a class of credence goods, by modeling AI as a compression of the discernible headroom between what machines produce at negligible cost and what buyers can distinguish. Below a critical headroom no separating equilibrium in production-side signals exists; the market pools, high-competence providers earn no premium, and those with outside options exit-Akerlof's lemons dynamic. An outcome-contingent signal-a warranty backed by damages D with ex-post verifiability phi-restores full separation at any level of AI capability whenever phi*D >= v, the value of a solved problem, under four preconditions stated explicitly and priced in turn: no seller-side private information beyond type; verifiable collectible retention behind the promise; no buyer influence on outcome or claim; negligible enforcement deadweight. Expected liability cost depends on whether the problem is solved, not on production costs. A further proposition shows that provenance certification priced as a type-independent stamp (e.g., C2PA) cannot restore full separation, while a verified commitment to forgo the AI frontier re-imposes the pre-AI artifact cost function. Two results endogenize contract institutions: civil-procedure costs set a minimum ticket size v_min below which the modeled court-enforced warranty cannot sustain separation; under liability insurance the signal-effective quantity is the retained, collectible exposure. We state falsification conditions and propose a preregistered conjoint experiment with German-speaking B2B decision-makers; the estimand is willingness to pay in excess of the promise's actuarial value.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Bauer, 2026. "The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services," Papers 2607.26327, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.26327
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.26327
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
    2. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
    3. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Bauer, 2026. "The Institutional Window: Occupation- and Jurisdiction-Specific Calibration of Liability Signaling for Preserved Human Fallback Capability," Papers 2608.05969, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2026.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
    2. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    3. Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994. "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers 9409, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    4. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
    5. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contractual Signaling in a Market Environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 77-98, July.
    6. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    7. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    8. Boyer, Marcel & Mahenc, Philippe & Moreaux, Michel, 1995. "Entry Blockading Locations," IDEI Working Papers 53, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    9. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2019. "Induced Price Leadership and (Counter-)Spying Rivals' Play under Incomplete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 7476, CESifo.
    10. Truyts, Tom, 2012. "Signaling and indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 331-340.
    11. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 141-150.
    12. Boyer, Marcel & Mahenc, Phillippe & Moreaux, Michel, 2003. "Asymmetric information and product differentiation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 93-113, January.
    13. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2016. "Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 589-620, December.
    14. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2011. "Competition and the signaling role of prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 412-425, July.
    15. Hviid, Morten, 1996. "Default rules and equilibrium selection of contract terms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 233-245, June.
    16. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    17. Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March.
    18. Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
    19. Jean-Paul L'Huillier, 2012. "Consumers' Imperfect Information and Price Rigidities," EIEF Working Papers Series 1209, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Aug 2012.
    20. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Prat, Julien, 2012. "Job market signaling and employer learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1787-1817.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.26327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.