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Why Do We Observe Minimal Warranties?

Author

Listed:
  • Nancy A. Lutz

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

  • V. Padmanabhan

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Why is it that some products carry a minimal manufacturer base warranty even though all consumers are risk-averse? Conventional wisdom suggests that it is profitable for the manufacturer to offer a comprehensive warranty in this setting. We provide in this paper an explanation for the provision of minimal warranty in markets where all consumers are risk-averse. Minimal warranties are created by the impact of consumer moral hazard and competition in the insurance after-market for the product. We show that consumers who purchase optional extended warranties from an independent provider of insurance create a significant negative externality on the warranty redemption costs of the manufacturer. This, in turn, creates a significant erosion in the manufacturer's profits from warranty insurance. Consequently, it is in the best interest of the manufacturer to drop the level of warranty coverage provided with the product. This intuition holds for homogeneous as well as heterogeneous markets of consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Nancy A. Lutz & V. Padmanabhan, 1995. "Why Do We Observe Minimal Warranties?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 417-441.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:14:y:1995:i:4:p:417-441
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.14.4.417
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anthony Dukes & Yi Zhu, 2019. "Why Customer Service Frustrates Consumers: Using a Tiered Organizational Structure to Exploit Hassle Costs," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 500-515, May.
    2. Lei, Yong & Liu, Qian & Shum, Stephen, 2017. "Warranty pricing with consumer learning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 263(2), pages 596-610.
    3. Mai, Dung T. & Liu, Tieming & Morris, Michael D.S. & Sun, Shuzhen, 2017. "Quality coordination with extended warranty for store-brand products," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 524-532.
    4. Lutz, Nancy A. & Padmanabhan, V., 1998. "Warranties, extended warranties, and product quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 463-493, July.
    5. Roland Kirstein & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, "undated". "Erzeugt der Europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2007-1-1172, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    6. Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein, "undated". "Europäischer Verbraucherschutz – Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1160, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    7. Murthy, D. N. P. & Djamaludin, I., 2002. "New product warranty: A literature review," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 231-260, October.
    8. Tao Na & Zhang Sheng, 2015. "Designing the Optimal Extended Warranty Price with Indirect Network Effect," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 59-67, February.
    9. Kjell Hausken, 2002. "Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(1), pages 17-27, February.
    10. Ammar Y. Alqahtani & Surendra M. Gupta, 2017. "One-Dimensional Renewable Warranty Management within Sustainable Supply Chain," Resources, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-26, April.
    11. Junhong Chu & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 2009. "Quantifying the Economic Value of Warranties in the U.S. Server Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 99-121, 01-02.
    12. Lu, Zhen & Shang, Jennifer, 2019. "Warranty mechanism for pre-owned tech products: Collaboration between E-tailers and online warranty provider," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 119-131.
    13. Lianmin Zhang & Lei Guan & Daniel Zhuoyu Long & Houcai Shen & Huajun Tang, 2023. "Who is better off by selling extended warranties in the supply chain: the manufacturer, the retailer, or both?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 328(2), pages 1557-1583, September.
    14. Li, Kunpeng & Chhajed, Dilip & Mallik, Suman, 2005. "Design of Extended Warranties in Supply Chains," Working Papers 05-0128, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    15. Bo Jiang & Xubing Zhang, 2011. "How Does a Retailer's Service Plan Affect a Manufacturer's Warranty?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 727-740, April.
    16. Cao, Zixia, 2022. "Brand equity, warranty costs, and firm value," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 1166-1185.
    17. Alqahtani, Ammar Y. & Gupta, Surendra M. & Nakashima, Kenichi, 2019. "Warranty and maintenance analysis of sensor embedded products using internet of things in industry 4.0," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 483-499.
    18. Aidan Hollis, 1996. "Exclusivity Restrictions in Markets with Adverse Selection: The Case of Extended Warranties," Working Papers ecpap-96-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    19. Kirkizoğlu, Zeynep & Karaer, Özgen, 2022. "After-sales service and warranty decisions of a durable goods manufacturer," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

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