IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2607.29080.html

Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem

Author

Listed:
  • Ozgun Ekici
  • Sinan Ertemel
  • M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract

We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not be assigned to an agent who ranks it more highly than another agent unless the latter receives a more preferred object. We show that the set of Rawlsian equitable allocations coincides with the set of stable allocations in an auxiliary market where object priorities depend on agents' preference reports. The agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm computes the agent-optimal element of this set, but no Rawlsian equitable rule is strategy-proof in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Ozgun Ekici & Sinan Ertemel & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026. "Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem," Papers 2607.29080, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.29080
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.29080
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.29080. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.