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Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem

Author

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  • Ozgun Ekici
  • Sinan Ertemel
  • M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract

We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not be assigned to an agent who ranks it more highly than another agent unless the latter receives a more preferred object. We show that the set of Rawlsian equitable allocations coincides with the set of stable allocations in an auxiliary market where object priorities depend on agents' preference reports. The agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm computes the agent-optimal element of this set, but no Rawlsian equitable rule is strategy-proof in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Ozgun Ekici & Sinan Ertemel & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026. "Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem," Papers 2607.29080, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.29080
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Szilvia Pápai, 2026. "Singleton-Attainability and Transparent Access in Matching," Working Papers 26001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    2. Szilvia P'apai, 2026. "Singleton-Attainability and Transparent Access in Matching," Papers 2609.27293, arXiv.org.

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