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Report NEP-DES-2026-09-07
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Frank Yang & Piotr Dworczak, 2026, "Searchable Menus," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.17446, Aug.
- Michael Ostrovsky & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2026, "Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.00334, Jul.
- Federico INNOCENTI & Nicola DONI & Domenico MENICUCCI, 2026, "Information Design and Entry in Auctions," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_09.rdf.
- Federico Vaccari, 2026, "Shadow-score auctions for execution incentives," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.29420, Jul.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Luke Lindsay & Xavier Del Pozo, 2026, "Avoidable Costs and Market Design," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 2611, Aug.
- Ozgun Ekici & Sinan Ertemel & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2026, "Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.29080, Jul.
- Uriel Feige & Yotam Gafni, 2026, "Fair Allocation with Optional Selling," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.24600, Aug.
- Thirumulanathan D, 2026, "On Deterministic Optimal Mechanisms in a Two-Item Setting for Distributions with Nondecreasing Density," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.22371, Aug.
- Shunya Noda & Ayano Yago, 2026, "The Role of Precedence Order in Matching with Multi-Criteria Admissions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.29139, Jul.
- Zhiyuan Jia, 2026, "Random Cap: Optimal Informationally Robust Delegation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.19846, Aug, revised Aug 2026.
- Hülya Eraslan & Jeremy T. Fox & YingHua He, 2026, "Measuring the Welfare Gains from Cardinal-Preference Mechanisms in School Choice," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35658, Aug.
- Vravosinos, Orestis & Vives, Xavier, 2024, "Strategic complementarity in games," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19214, Jul.
- Daisuke Hirata & Yusuke Kasuya, 2026, "Strong Observable Substitutability and the Cumulative Offer Mechanism," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.27784, Aug.
- Bo Chen & Rui Gao & Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang, 2026, "Outcome Disclosure and Temporal Refinement in Multi-Battle Team Contests," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.22694, Aug.
- Aloisio Araujo & Carolina Parra & Sergei Vieira, 2026, "Monotone Allocations without Single-Crossing: When to Bunch and When to Jump," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.19474, Aug.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Fershtman, Daniel & FRUG, ALEXANDER, 2024, "Clerks," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19307, Jul.
- Rui Mao & Tingliang Huang & Houcai Shen, 2026, "Optimal Liability Design for Medical AI," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.03114, Aug.
- Federico Etro, 2026, "Moral Hazard and Competitive Paradoxes," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_16.rdf.