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Searchable Menus

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Listed:
  • Frank Yang
  • Piotr Dworczak

Abstract

Multidimensional screening is (in)famously intractable. In this paper, we study optimal screening mechanisms subject to a tractability constraint from the agent's perspective. Specifically, we require that the menu of options offered by the designer can be ordered so that, regardless of her preference type, the agent can find a utility-maximizing option via greedy search: any locally optimal choice must also be globally optimal. In one-dimensional screening with the single-crossing property, this requirement has no bite. In multidimensional environments, however, searchability restricts the set of implementable outcomes. In the multiproduct monopoly problem, the optimal searchable menu is a sparse upgrade menu: higher tiers offer higher allocation probabilities for every good, and the number of tiers is at most the number of goods. In a multidimensional screening problem with money and ordeals, the optimal searchable menu offers the agent a single way to obtain the good. In income taxation with rich multidimensional heterogeneity, a tax schedule is searchable if and only if it is progressive.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Yang & Piotr Dworczak, 2026. "Searchable Menus," Papers 2608.17446, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.17446
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    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.17446
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    2. Soheil Ghili, 2023. "A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Nonadditive Values," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 311-326, September.
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