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The implicit (un)healthy life expectancy used for pricing long-term care insurance and life care annuities

Author

Listed:
  • Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

    (Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain).)

  • Antonio Romero-Medina

    (Department of Economics. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2023. "The implicit (un)healthy life expectancy used for pricing long-term care insurance and life care annuities," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2023-03, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2303
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    2. Tang, Qianfeng & Yu, Jingsheng, 2014. "A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 543-561.
    3. Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf, 2019. "Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 167-187.
    4. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
    5. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 971-987, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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