IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2607.03113.html

Rebate versus Matching, Again: How Opt-in Reshapes the Effectiveness of Price-Equivalent Subsidies

Author

Listed:
  • Shusaku Sasaki
  • Takunori Ishihara
  • Hiroki Kato

Abstract

Traditional theory predicts equivalent effects of matching and rebate subsidies at equal prices, yet experiments favor matching. Refinements narrow this gap but retain compulsory assignment; take-up is voluntary in practice. We test this implementation margin in a nationwide, incentivized donation experiment with 2,400 Japanese adults, crossing subsidy type and assignment rule. After equalizing budget constraints and accounting for comprehension, total giving is indistinguishable under compulsory assignment. Under opt-in, the matching advantage re-emerges and nearly quadruples because rebate loses effectiveness. LATE estimates suggest advantageous selection into matching but disadvantageous selection into rebate. Self-selection can reshape the policy ranking of price-equivalent instruments.

Suggested Citation

  • Shusaku Sasaki & Takunori Ishihara & Hiroki Kato, 2026. "Rebate versus Matching, Again: How Opt-in Reshapes the Effectiveness of Price-Equivalent Subsidies," Papers 2607.03113, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.03113
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.03113
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meredith Fowlie & Catherine Wolfram & Patrick Baylis & C Anna Spurlock & Annika Todd-Blick & Peter Cappers, 2021. "Default Effects And Follow-On Behaviour: Evidence From An Electricity Pricing Program," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(6), pages 2886-2934.
    2. Laura Castell & Marc Gurgand & Clément Imbert & Todor Tochev, 2025. "Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1-29, November.
    3. Koichiro Ito & Takanori Ida & Makoto Tanaka, 2023. "Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(11), pages 2937-2973, November.
    4. Amy Finkelstein & Matthew J Notowidigdo, 2019. "Take-Up and Targeting: Experimental Evidence from SNAP," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(3), pages 1505-1556.
    5. Douglas Davis & Edward Millner & Robert Reilly, 2005. "Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(2), pages 85-106, June.
    6. René Bekkers, 2015. "When and Why Matches Are More Effective Subsidies than Rebates," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Replication in Experimental Economics, volume 18, pages 183-211, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    7. Shusaku Sasaki & Hirofumi Kurokawa & Fumio Ohtake, 2022. "An experimental comparison of rebate and matching in charitable giving: The case of Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 147-177, January.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    9. Joseph P. Romano & Michael Wolf, 2005. "Stepwise Multiple Testing as Formalized Data Snooping," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(4), pages 1237-1282, July.
    10. repec:jdm:journl:v:17:y:2022:i:5:p:1058-1071 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. John A. List & Azeem M. Shaikh & Yang Xu, 2019. "Multiple hypothesis testing in experimental economics," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(4), pages 773-793, December.
    12. Catherine Eckel & Philip Grossman, 2008. "Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(3), pages 234-252, September.
    13. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    14. Faith Fatchen & John A. List & Francesca Pagnotta, 2025. "Using AI to Generate Option C Scaling Ideas: A Case Study in Early Education," NBER Working Papers 33924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Castell, Laura & Gurgand, Marc & Imbert, Clément & Tochev, Todor, 2025. "Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France," CEPR Discussion Papers 20615, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    16. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2006. "Subsidizing Charitable Giving with Rebates or Matching: Further Laboratory Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(4), pages 794-807, April.
    17. Umer, Hamza, 2023. "Effectiveness of random payment in Experiments: A meta-Analysis of dictator games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    18. John A. List, 2024. "Optimally generate policy-based evidence before scaling," Nature, Nature, vol. 626(7999), pages 491-499, February.
    19. Daniel M. Hungerman & Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2021. "Impure Impact Giving: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1553-1614.
    20. Laura Castell & Marc Gurgand & Clément Imbert & Todor Tochev, 2025. "Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-05366074, HAL.
    21. Takanori Ida & Takunori Ishihara & Koichiro Ito & Daido Kido & Toru Kitagawa & Shosei Sakaguchi & Shusaku Sasaki, 2026. "Choosing Who Chooses: Selection‐Driven Targeting in Energy Rebate Programs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 94(1), pages 225-247, January.
    22. Johannes Diederich & Catherine C. Eckel & Raphael Epperson & Timo Goeschl & Philip J. Grossman, 2022. "Subsidizing unit donations: matches, rebates, and discounts compared," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 734-758, April.
    23. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2003. "Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize charitable contributions matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 681-701, March.
    24. Kimberley Scharf & Sarah Smith, 2015. "The price elasticity of charitable giving: does the form of tax relief matter?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(2), pages 330-352, April.
    25. Blumenthal, Marsha & Kalambokidis, Laura & Turk, Alex, 2012. "Subsidizing Charitable Contributions With a Match Instead of a Deduction: What Happens to Donations and Compliance?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 65(1), pages 91-116, March.
    26. Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2006. "Subsidizing Charitable Giving with Rebates or Matching: Further Laboratory Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 794-807, April.
    27. Eckel, Catherine & Grossman, Philip J., 2017. "Comparing rebate and matching subsidies controlling for donors’ awareness: Evidence from the field," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 88-95.
    28. Richard Domurat & Isaac Menashe & Wesley Yin, 2021. "The Role of Behavioral Frictions in Health Insurance Marketplace Enrollment and Risk: Evidence from a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(5), pages 1549-1574, May.
    29. Chan, Nathan W. & Knowles, Stephen & Peeters, Ronald & Wolk, Leonard, 2022. "Perception of generosity under matching and rebate subsidies," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(5), pages 1058-1071, September.
    30. Gwen-Jiro Clochard & Shubham Dey & Shusaku Sasaki & Taisuke Imai, 2025. "Revisiting the Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving: Meta-Analysis of Tax Incentives and Matching Donations," ISER Discussion Paper 1299, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    31. Vivi Alatas & Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Benjamin A. Olken & Ririn Purnamasari & Matthew Wai-Poi, 2016. "Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(2), pages 371-427.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Shusaku Sasaki & Hirofumi Kurokawa & Fumio Ohtake, 2022. "An experimental comparison of rebate and matching in charitable giving: The case of Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 147-177, January.
    2. Roman M. Sheremeta & Neslihan Uler, 2021. "The impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on giving," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 355-386, June.
    3. Johannes Diederich & Catherine C. Eckel & Raphael Epperson & Timo Goeschl & Philip J. Grossman, 2022. "Subsidizing unit donations: matches, rebates, and discounts compared," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 734-758, April.
    4. Adena, Maja, 2021. "How can we improve tax incentives for charitable giving? Lessons from field experiments in fundraising," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 344-353.
    5. Fielding, David & Knowles, Stephen & Peeters, Ronald, 2023. "Timing of rebates and generosity," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    6. Indranil Goswami & Oleg Urminsky, 2018. "No Substitute for the Real Thing: The Importance of In-Context Field Experiments In Fundraising," Natural Field Experiments 00660, The Field Experiments Website.
    7. Krasteva, Silvana & Saboury, Piruz, 2021. "Informative fundraising: The signaling value of seed money and matching gifts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    8. Yamamura, Eiji & Tsutsui, Yoshiro & Ohtake, Fumio, 2018. "Altruistic and selfish motivations of charitable giving: The case of the hometown tax donation system (Furusato nozei) in Japan," MPRA Paper 86181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Gandullia, Luca & Lezzi, Emanuela, 2018. "The price elasticity of charitable giving: New experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 88-91.
    10. Diederich, Johannes & Eckel, Catherine C. & Epperson, Raphael & Goeschl, Timo & Grossman, Philip J., 2019. "Subsidizing Quantity Donations: Matches, Rebates, and Discounts Compared," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203650, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Livingston, Jeffrey A. & Rasulmukhamedov, Rustam, 2023. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games When the Recipient is a Charity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 275-285.
    12. Eiji Yamamura & Yoshiro Tsutsui & Fumio Ohtake, 2025. "Correction: An analysis of altruistic and selfish motivations underlying hometown tax donations in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 689-690, July.
    13. Eiji Yamamura & Yoshiro Tsutsui & Fumio Ohtake, 2017. "Altruistic and selfish motivations of charitable giving:Case of the hometown tax donation system in Japan," ISER Discussion Paper 1003, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    14. Neslihan Uler, 2011. "Public goods provision, inequality and taxes," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 287-306, September.
    15. Chan, Nathan W. & Knowles, Stephen & Peeters, Ronald & Wolk, Leonard, 2024. "On generosity in public good and charitable dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 624-640.
    16. Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan, 2020. "Optimal Incentives to Give," IZA Discussion Papers 13321, IZA Network @ LISER.
    17. Freundt, Jana & Lange, Andreas, 2021. "On the voluntary provision of public goods under risk," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    18. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2023. "Inter-charity competition under spatial differentiation: Sorting, crowding, and spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 457-468.
    19. Indranil Goswami & Indranil Goswami, 2020. "No Substitute for the Real Thing: The Importance of In-Context Field Experiments in Fundraising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(6), pages 1052-1070, November.
    20. Eckel, Catherine & Guney, Begum & Uler, Neslihan, 2020. "Independent vs. Coordinated Fundraising: Understanding the Role of Information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.03113. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.