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Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France

Author

Listed:
  • Laura Castell

    (INSEE - Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE))

  • Marc Gurgand

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Clément Imbert

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Todor Tochev

    (IPP - Institut des politiques publiques)

Abstract

We report on two nationwide experiments with job seekers in France. We first show that a meeting with social services to assess eligibility and help with application to social benefits increased new benefit take-up by 31 %. By contrast, an online simulator that gave personalized information on benefit eligibility did not increase take-up. Marginal treatment effects show that individuals who benefit the most from the meetings are the least likely to attend. Overall, without ruling out information frictions, our results suggest that transaction costs represent the main obstacle to applying for benefits or accessing government's assistance to help apply.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Castell & Marc Gurgand & Clément Imbert & Todor Tochev, 2024. "Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) halshs-04720989, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-04720989
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04720989v1
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Shusaku Sasaki & Takunori Ishihara & Hiroki Kato, 2026. "Rebate versus Matching, Again: How Opt-in Reshapes the Effectiveness of Price-Equivalent Subsidies," Papers 2607.03113, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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