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Competition for being visited first and ordered search deterrence

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  • Wojciech Olszewski
  • Yutong Zhang

Abstract

When customers must visit a seller to learn the valuation of its product, sellers potentially benefit from charging a lower price on the first visit and a higher price when a buyer returns. Armstrong and Zhou (2016) show that such price discrimination can arise in equilibrium when buyers learn a seller's pricing policy only upon visiting. We depart from this assumption by supposing that sellers commit to observable pricing policies that guide consumer search and buyers can choose whom to visit first. We show that no seller engages in price discrimination in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Wojciech Olszewski & Yutong Zhang, 2025. "Competition for being visited first and ordered search deterrence," Papers 2512.08136, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2512.08136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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