IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2507.05490.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Community Bail Fund Systems: Fluid Limits and Approximations

Author

Listed:
  • Yidan Zhang
  • Jamol Pender

Abstract

Community bail funds (CBFs) assist individuals who have been arrested and cannot afford bail, preventing unnecessary pretrial incarceration along with its harmful or sometimes fatal consequences. By posting bail, CBFs allow defendants to stay at home and maintain their livelihoods until trial. This paper introduces new stochastic models that combine queueing theory with classic insurance risk models to capture the dynamics of the remaining funds in a CBF. We first analyze a model where all bail requests are accepted. Although the remaining fund balance can go negative, this model provides insight for CBFs that are not financially constrained. We then apply the Skorokhod map to make sure the CBF balance does not go negative and show that the Skorokhod map produces a model where requests are partially fulfilled. Finally, we analyze a model where bail requests can be blocked if there is not enough money to satisfy the request upon arrival. Although the blocking model prevents the CBF from being negative, the blocking feature gives rise to new analytical challenges for a direct stochastic analysis. Thus, we prove a functional law of large numbers or a fluid limit for the blocking model and show that the fluid limit is a distributed delay equation. We assess the quality of our fluid limit via simulation and show that the fluid limit accurately describes the large-scale stochastic dynamics of the CBF. Finally, we prove stochastic ordering results for the CBF processes we analyze.

Suggested Citation

  • Yidan Zhang & Jamol Pender, 2025. "Community Bail Fund Systems: Fluid Limits and Approximations," Papers 2507.05490, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2507.05490
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.05490
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alfred Blumstein & Richard Larson, 1969. "Models of a Total Criminal Justice System," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(2), pages 199-232, April.
    2. Mericcan Usta & Lawrence M Wein, 2015. "Assessing Risk-Based Policies for Pretrial Release and Split Sentencing in Los Angeles County Jails," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(12), pages 1-16, December.
    3. Robert L. Bray & Decio Coviello & Andrea Ichino & Nicola Persico, 2016. "Multitasking, Multiarmed Bandits, and the Italian Judiciary," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 18(4), pages 545-558, October.
    4. Shany Azaria & Boaz Ronen & Noam Shamir, 2024. "Alleviating Court Congestion: The Case of the Jerusalem District Court," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 54(3), pages 267-281, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pritam, Kocherlakota Satya & Sugandha, & Mathur, Trilok & Agarwal, Shivi, 2021. "Underlying dynamics of crime transmission with memory," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    2. Antonio Peyrache & Angelo Zago, 2020. "The (in)efficiency of Justice. An equilibrium analysis of supply policies," CEPA Working Papers Series WP042020, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    3. Gneezy, Uri & Nelidov, Vadim & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2023. "When opportunities backfire: Alternatives reduce perseverance and success in task completion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 304-324.
    4. Ruomeng Cui & Hao Ding & Feng Zhu, 2020. "Gender Inequality in Research Productivity During the COVID-19 Pandemic," Papers 2006.10194, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    5. Veronica Rattini, 2023. "Worker autonomy and performance: Evidence from a real‐effort experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 300-327, April.
    6. Kaufmann, Marc, 2022. "Projection bias in effort choices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 368-393.
    7. Richard Charles Larson, 2002. "Public Sector Operations Research: A Personal Journey," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(1), pages 135-145, February.
    8. Auerhahn, Kathleen, 2008. "Dynamic systems simulation analysis: A planning tool for the new century," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 293-300, August.
    9. Chemin, Matthieu & Kimalu, Paul & Newman-Bachand, Simon, 2024. "Courts, Crime and Economic Performance: Evidence from a Judicial Reform in Kenya," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    10. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2023. "Task allocation and on-the-job training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    11. Tarantino, Emanuele & Simcoe, Timothy S. & Ganglmair, Bernhard, 2018. "Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation," CEPR Discussion Papers 12733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Bansal, Komal & Mathur, Trilok & Agarwal, Shivi, 2023. "Fractional-order crime propagation model with non-linear transmission rate," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    13. Grajzl, Peter & Silwal, Shikha, 2020. "Multi-court judging and judicial productivity in a career judiciary: Evidence from Nepal," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    14. Kevin Petersen & Donald Papy & Alejandro Mouro & Barak Ariel, 2023. "The usage and utility of body‐worn camera footage in courts: A survey analysis of state prosecutors," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(3), pages 534-569, September.
    15. Auerbach, Jan U. & Fonseca, Miguel A., 2020. "Preordered service in contract enforcement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 130-149.
    16. repec:plo:pone00:0088923 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Alfred Blumstein, 2002. "Crime Modeling 1," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(1), pages 16-24, February.
    18. Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
    19. Antonio Peyrache & Angelo Zago, 2024. "The inefficiency of courts of justice: industry structure, capacity and misallocation," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 217-238, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2507.05490. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.