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The Emergence of League and Sub-League Structure in the Population Lotto Game

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  • Giovanni Artiglio
  • Aiden Youkhana
  • Joel Nishimura

Abstract

In order to understand if and how strategic resource allocation can constrain the structure of pair-wise competition outcomes in competitive human competitions we introduce a new multiplayer resource allocation game, the Population Lotto Game. This new game allows agents to allocate their resources across a continuum of possible specializations. While this game allows non-transitive cycles between players, we show that the Nash equilibrium of the game also forms a hierarchical structure between discrete `leagues' based on their different resource budgets, with potential sub-league structure and/or non-transitive cycles inside individual leagues. We provide an algorithm that can find a particular Nash equilibrium for any finite set of discrete sub-population sizes and budgets. Further, our algorithm finds the unique Nash equilibrium that remains stable for the subset of players with budgets below any threshold.

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  • Giovanni Artiglio & Aiden Youkhana & Joel Nishimura, 2022. "The Emergence of League and Sub-League Structure in the Population Lotto Game," Papers 2209.00143, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2209.00143
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