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Optimal Verification of Rumors in Networks

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  • Luca Paolo Merlino
  • Nicole Tabasso

Abstract

We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher rumor prevalence can increase the prevalence of the truth. We uncover conditions such that this happens and discuss policy implications. Specifically, a planner aiming to maximize the prevalence of the truth should allow rumors to circulate if: verification overcomes ignorance of messages, transmission of information is relatively low, and the planner's budget to induce verification is neither too low nor too high.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Paolo Merlino & Nicole Tabasso, 2022. "Optimal Verification of Rumors in Networks," Papers 2207.01830, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2207.01830
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 549-573.
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    4. Talamàs, Eduard & Vohra, Rakesh, 2020. "Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 277-289.
    5. Tabasso, Nicole, 2019. "Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 219-240.
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