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Leadership and Institutional Reforms

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  • Matata Ponyo Mapon
  • Jean-Paul K. Tsasa

Abstract

Large-scale institutional changes require strong commitment and involvement of all stakeholders. We use the standard framework of cooperative game theory developed by Ichiishi (1983, pp. 78-149) to: (i) establish analytically the difference between policy maker and political leader; (ii) formally study interactions between a policy maker and his followers; (iii) examine the role of leadership in the implementation of structural reforms. We show that a policy maker can be both partisan and non-partisan, while a political leader can only be non-partisan. Following this distinction, we derive the probability of success of an institutional change, as well as the nature of the gain that such a change would generate on the beneficiary population. Based on the restrictions of this simple mathematical model and using some evidence from the Congolese experience between 2012 and 2016, we show that institutional changes can indeed benefit the majority of the population, when policy makers are truly partisan.

Suggested Citation

  • Matata Ponyo Mapon & Jean-Paul K. Tsasa, 2021. "Leadership and Institutional Reforms," Papers 2101.08702, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2101.08702
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