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Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Kyropoulou
  • Josu'e Ortega
  • Erel Segal-Halevi

Abstract

Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their proportional counterparts, despite the fact that agents very often manipulate them. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning reduces truth-telling behavior, but also reduces envy.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Kyropoulou & Josu'e Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice," Papers 1810.08243, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1810.08243
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hadi Hosseini, 2023. "The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making," Papers 2312.14402, arXiv.org.
    2. Dwayne Woods, 2023. "The Sponge Cake Dilemma over the Nile: Achieving Fairness in Resource Allocation with Cake Cutting Algorithms," Papers 2310.11472, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    3. Josué Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2022. "Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 969-988, November.

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