The Sponge Cake Dilemma over the Nile: Achieving Fairness in Resource Allocation through Rawlsian Theory and Algorithms

This article examines water disputes through an integrated framework combining normative and positive perspectives. John Rawls' theory of justice provides moral guidance, upholding rights to reasonable access for all riparian states. However, positive analysis using cake-cutting models reveals real-world strategic constraints. While Rawls defines desired ends, cake-cutting offers algorithmic means grounded in actual behaviors. The Nile River basin dispute illustrates this synthesis. Rawls suggests inherent rights to water, but unrestricted competition could enable monopoly. His principles alone cannot prevent unfavorable outcomes, given limitations like self-interest. This is where cake-cutting provides value despite biased claims. Its models identify arrangements aligning with Rawlsian fairness while incorporating strategic considerations. The article details the cake-cutting theory, reviews water conflicts literature, examines the Nile case, explores cooperative vs. non-cooperative games, and showcases algorithmic solutions. The integrated framework assesses pathways for implementing Rawlsian ideals given real-world dynamics. This novel synthesis of normative and positive lenses enriches the study of water disputes and resource allocation more broadly.