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Fair Division, Adjusted Winner Procedure (AW), and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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  • Tansa George Massoud

    (Department of Political Science, Bucknell University)

Abstract

A dispute resolution mechanism called Adjusted Winner (AW), developed by Brams and Taylor, is used to propose a plausible solution to the final status issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Unlike conventional negotiating procedures, AW possesses desirable qualities including equitability, efficiency, and envy freeness. Based on data from an original survey, results show that when the issues of security and borders are kept separate, Israel is likely to have its demands met on the issues of security, East Jerusalem, normalization of relations, and water. The Palestinians will win on the issues of sovereignty, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Israeli settlements in Gaza, and Palestinian refugees. Both sides will need to compromise on the issue of boundaries. If security and borders are lumped together as one issue, Israel and the Palestinians will share on the issue of East Jerusalem.

Suggested Citation

  • Tansa George Massoud, 2000. "Fair Division, Adjusted Winner Procedure (AW), and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(3), pages 333-358, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:3:p:333-358
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044003003
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    Cited by:

    1. Kyropoulou, Maria & Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2022. "Fair cake-cutting in practice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 28-49.
    2. Ershad Oftadeh & Mojtaba Shourian & Bahram Saghafian, 2017. "An Ultimatum Game Theory Based Approach for Basin Scale Water Allocation Conflict Resolution," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(13), pages 4293-4308, October.
    3. John Zeleznikow, 2014. "Comparing the Israel–Palestinian Dispute to Australian Family Mediation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(6), pages 1301-1317, November.
    4. Keith W. Hipel & D. Marc Kilgour & Rami A. Kinsara, 2014. "Strategic Investigations of Water Conflicts in the Middle East," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 355-376, May.
    5. Maria Kyropoulou & Josu'e Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice," Papers 1810.08243, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    6. Robby Timothy Warioba & Kennedy Arthur Wainyaragania & Bassiratu Ballay Mansaray, 2019. "A Game Theory View of China and USA FDI Outflows: Static Cournot Model of Complete Information," Academic Journal of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest, vol. 5(2), pages 99-107, June.

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