Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Herreiner, Dorothea K. & Puppe, Clemens, 2010. "Inequality aversion and efficiency with ordinal and cardinal social preferences--An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 238-253, November.
- Radzvilas, Mantas, 2016. "Hypothetical Bargaining and the Equilibrium Selection Problem in Non-Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 70248, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kohler, Stefan, 2013. "Inequality aversion causes equal or unequal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brown, Alexander L. & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2016.
"The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 115-131.
- Alexander L. Brown & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2014. "The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems," Working Papers 20140918-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Lars Schwettmann, 2012. "Competing allocation principles: time for compromise?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 357-380, September.
- Kohler, Stefan, 2012. "Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Balazs Sziklai & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2015. "Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1552, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
More about this item
Keywordsfairness; envy freeness; social preferences; bargaining; A13O; C78O; C91O; D63O;
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