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Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare Enhancing Cartels

Author

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  • In `t Veld, D.

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Tuinstra, J.

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any efficiencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the firms outside the cartel react to this by expanding output. If the outsiders are more efficient than the cartel firms average production costs go down. Even for relatively moderate differences in efficiency total welfare may increase due to this market-induced rationalization.

Suggested Citation

  • In `t Veld, D. & Tuinstra, J., 2012. "Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare Enhancing Cartels," CeNDEF Working Papers 12-06, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:12-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Koert Buiren & Daan in ‘t Veld & Janneke Voort, 2019. "State Aid and Competition: Application of a Social Welfare Criterion to State Aid," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 389-411, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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