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Top Income Tax Evasion and Redistribution Preferences: Evidence from the Panama Papers

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Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence that, after fiscal scandals, individuals substantially revise their views on redistribution. I exploit as a quasi-natural experiment the 2016 Panama Papers scandal which revealed top-income tax evasion behaviour simultaneously worldwide. The empirical investigation relies on two original sources of data: a longitudinal dataset on United Kingdom households and a survey conducted in twenty-two European countries. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I find an increase in pro-redistribution statements post-scandal ranging between 2% and 3.3%. Responses are heterogeneous on income levels and on political affiliations, with larger responses from right-wing individuals. The change in redistribution preferences is moderately translated into votes: I find an increase in voting intentions for the left and negative for the right-wing parties. Complementary estimations at the European-level indicate that pro-redistribution responses increase with media coverage and shock intensity (i.e., number of individuals involved).

Suggested Citation

  • Laila Ait Bihi Ouali, 2019. "Top Income Tax Evasion and Redistribution Preferences: Evidence from the Panama Papers," AMSE Working Papers 1901, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1901
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Panama Papers; Tax evasion; tax avoidance; Redistribution; tax morale; Inequality; mass media;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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