Efficient Land Tenure Contract Under Asymmetric Information
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.35821
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- Dasgupta, Siddhartha & Love, H. Alan & Knight, Thomas O. & Devadoss, Stephen, 1998. "Testing For Cooperative Behavior: An Empirical Study Of Land Tenure Contracts In Texas," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20917, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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