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Das neue Gentechnikgesetz - ein Gentechnikverhinderungsgesetz?

Author

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  • Becker, Alexander
  • Holm-Muller, Karin

Abstract

In addition to existing juridical analyses of the new German act for genetic engineering, this article deals with an environmental economic assessment. It is examined what kind of external costs will arise by using/applying genetic engineering and how they will be allocated. Our focus is on the costs that explicitly evolve from the societal postulated coexistence of conventional/ organic farms and users of biotechnology. If the protection of the existing production is accepted, as postulated by politics, the new act internalizes the so called market losses relatively well. In this context, the design of precautionary duties that have to be still established by law is of utmost importance. To avoid the dangers of an excessive liability by the farmer, it is from an economic point of view a good alternative, if the producers of genetically modified crops take the responsibility for any litigation claims to farmers. Furthermore negotiations between neighbouring farms could be an option to keep the costs for damage prevention to a minimum. Erganzend zu den bereits vorliegenden juristischen Analysen des neuen deutschen Gentechnikgesetzes beschaftigt sich der vorliegende Artikel mit einer umweltokonomischen Beurteilung. Untersucht wird, welche externen Kosten bei der Nutzung der "Grunen Gentechnik" entstehen und wie sie auf die Beteiligten verteilt werden. Dabei liegt der Fokus auf den Kosten, die explizit fur die gesellschaftlich geforderte Koexistenz von konventionellen/ okologischen Betrieben und Nutzern der Gentechnik entstehen. Wird der politisch gesetzte estandsschutz fur die bestehenden Produktionssysteme akzeptiert, so zeigt sich, dass eine korrekte Internalisierung der so genannten Vermarktungsschaden relativ gut erreicht werden kann. In diesem Zusammenhang spielt jedoch die Ausgestaltung der Vorsorgepflichten, die noch in einer Rechtsverordnung zur Guten fachlichen Praxis festgeschrieben warden mussen, eine erhebliche Rolle. Um der Gefahr einer Ubermasshaftung durch Landwirte zu begegnen, ist aus okonomischer Sicht die Haftungsubernahme durch die Hersteller der gentechnisch veranderten Pflanzen eine gute Moglichkeit. Auch bieten sich Verhandlungslosungen zwischen benachbarten Landwirten an, um eine kostenminimale Vermeidung von Schaden zu erreichen. Schlusselworter : gentechnikgesetz, haftung, koexistenz, vermarktungsschaden

Suggested Citation

  • Becker, Alexander & Holm-Muller, Karin, 2005. "Das neue Gentechnikgesetz - ein Gentechnikverhinderungsgesetz?," Discussion Papers 18775, University of Bonn, Institute for Food and Resource Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ubfred:18775
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.18775
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
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