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Old Age Security and Intergenerational Transfer of Family Farms

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  • Pesquin, Claudio
  • Kimhi, Ayal
  • Kislev, Yoav

Abstract

Old farmers often stay with their children on the farm and share its income while the succeeding family receives the farm together with the obligation to care for the parents in their retirement. Using an intrafamily insurance framework for old age security and a bargaining game to formulate the intergenerational contract, we offer assessments of the value of farm transfer in a cooperative village in Israel, both to the granting parents and to the receiving young family.

Suggested Citation

  • Pesquin, Claudio & Kimhi, Ayal & Kislev, Yoav, 1996. "Old Age Security and Intergenerational Transfer of Family Farms," Working Papers 232689, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Agricultural Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:huaewp:232689
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.232689
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kislev, Yoav & Leerman, Zvi & Zusman, Pinhas, 1991. "Recent Experience with Cooperative Farm Credit in Israel," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(4), pages 773-789, July.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Richard E. Just & Rulon D. Pope, 1979. "Production Function Estimation and Related Risk Considerations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 61(2), pages 276-284.
    4. Ayal Kimhi, 1995. "Differential Human Capital Investments and the Choice of Successor in Family Farms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(3), pages 719-724.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Farm Management;

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