Managing animal health status information in the cattle market
The paper analyses the problem of information in the cattle market, particularly as it relates to the status of animal health, and discusses ways to limit it with the view to improving social surplus. Against this background, it aims to achieve three major objectives. Firstly, it describes the ways of improving the level of information through such schemes as Conventional Warranties and Third Party Certification and the different choices made by sellers and buyers in the presence of these schemes. Secondly, it studies the various ways by which these schemes make an impact on equilibria in different markets (i.e., the pooling market and the premium market), and, consequently, on the social surplus. Thirdly, it identifies the necessary conditions for a third party/public decision-maker to increase social surplus and reduce the negative externality caused by disease by managing and supporting Third Party Certification. The paper shows that product certification and product warranty cannot coexist because product warranty is suboptimal. It also shows that certification, and a possible supporting of certification or animal testing does not necessarily improve the safety of the trade.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.eaae.org|
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- Carriquiry, Miguel A. & Babcock, Bruce A., 2005.
"Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry,"
2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI
19549, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Miguel Carriquiry & Bruce A. Babcock, 2007. "Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(1), pages 12-23.
- Carriquiry, Miguel A. & Babcock, Bruce A., 2004. "Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12215, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Miguel Carriquiry & Bruce A. Babcock, 2004. "Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 04-wp377, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
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- Athanasios G. Chymis & Harvey S. James & Srinivasa Konduru & Vern L. Pierce & Robert L. Larson, 2007.
"Asymmetric information in cattle auctions: the problem of revaccinations,"
International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 79-88, 01.
- Chymis, Athanasios G. & James, Harvey S., Jr. & Konduru, Srinivasa & Pierce, Vern L., 2004. "Asymmetric Information In Cattle Auctions: The Problem Of Revaccinations," Working Papers 26039, University of Missouri Columbia, Department of Agricultural Economics.
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