IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Risk Signaling in the Health Insurance Market

  • Chu-Shiu Li

    (Department of Economics, Feng Chia University, Taiwan)

Registered author(s):

    This paper analyzes equilibrium health insurance premium dependencies on signaling costs given individual health states, risk types, and risk type attributes. Since precise determination of an individual's premium is costly, insurers can categorize insureds based on relative screening costs. We show for two risk types, the equilibrium premium is either community-rated or risk-rated depending on screening costs. For multiple risk types, both policies may be concurrently available in equilibrium.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.ijbe.org/table%20of%20content/pdf/vol4-1/vol4-1-04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.ijbe.org/table%20of%20content/abstract/Vol.4/No.1/04.htm
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 45-52

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:4:y:2005:i:1:p:45-52
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 100 Wenhwa Road, Seatwen, Taichung
    Web page: http://www.ijbe.org/

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-44, April.
    2. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:4:y:2005:i:1:p:45-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yi-Ju Su)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.