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Pareto’s Revenge

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  • Kanbur, Ravi

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  • Kanbur, Ravi, 2005. "Pareto’s Revenge," Working Papers 127065, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:cudawp:127065
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127065
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    2. Paul A. Samuelson, 1950. "Evaluation Of Real National Income," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-29.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emil Tesliuc & Margaret Grosh & Azedine Ouerghi & Carlo del Ninno, 2008. "For Protection and Promotion : The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6582, April.

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