Generic Commodity Promotion And Product Differentiation
This paper considers whether generic promotion lowers the differentiation among competing brands as claimed in the 1997 Supreme Court case (Wileman et al. v. Glickman). Commodity promotion is modeled as a multi-stage game where products are vertically differentiated. Analytical results show that if the benefits of generic advertising from increased demand are outweighed by the costs from lower product differentiation then high-quality producers will not benefit from generic promotion but producers of lower-quality goods may.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lee, Hyunok & Alston, Julian M. & Carman, Hoy F. & Sutton, William R., 1996. "Mandated Marketing Programs For California Commodities," Information Series 11919, University of California, Davis, Giannini Foundation.
- Alston, Julian M. & Carman, Hoy F. & Chalfant, James A. & Crespi, John M. & Sexton, Richard J. & Venner, Raymond J., 1998. "The California Prune Board's Promotion Program: An Evaluation," Research Reports 11926, University of California, Davis, Giannini Foundation.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea99:21488. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.