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A Bioeconomic Model of Plant Disease Management under Spatial-Dynamic Externalities: Grapevine Leafroll Disease


  • Atallah, Shady S.
  • Gómez, Miguel I.
  • Conrad, Jon M.


Grapevine leafroll disease (GLRD) presently threatens the grape and wine industry worldwide. We develop a cellular automata model of GLRD diffusion and control in two ecologically-connected, independently-managed vineyards. One vineyard produces high-value wine grapes whereas the other produces low-value wine grapes. Disease management is modeled as a two-agent bargaining game. We show that under nooncooperative disease management, it is optimal for neither vineyard manager to control the disease. We consider the case of cooperative disease management and compute the benefits accruing from cooperation. We find it optimal for the manager of the high-value vineyard to pay the low-value vineyard manager to exit production. We determine the size of a Pareto-efficient side payment that can remedy the negative spatial externality emerging from noncooperative disease control.

Suggested Citation

  • Atallah, Shady S. & Gómez, Miguel I. & Conrad, Jon M., 2013. "A Bioeconomic Model of Plant Disease Management under Spatial-Dynamic Externalities: Grapevine Leafroll Disease," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 151144, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea13:151144

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lybbert, Travis J. & Magnan, Nicholas & Gubler, W. Douglas, 2010. "Powdery Mildew Risk And Forecasting In Wine Grapes: Do Growers Change Risk Management Strategies In Response To Disease Forecasts?," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61745, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. James E. Wilen, 2007. "Economics of Spatial-Dynamic Processes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1134-1144.
    3. Ussif Sumaila, 1997. "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(2), pages 147-165, September.
    4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    5. Cheryl Brown & Lori Lynch & David Zilberman, 2002. "The Economics of Controlling Insect-Transmitted Plant Diseases," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(2), pages 279-291.
    6. Bhat, Mahadev G. & Huffaker, Ray G., 2007. "Management of a transboundary wildlife population: A self-enforcing cooperative agreement with renegotiation and variable transfer payments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 54-67, January.
    7. Gordon R. Munro, 1979. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 355-376, August.
    8. Fuller, Kate B. & Alston, Julian M. & Sanchirico, James N., 2011. "Spatial Externalities and Vector-Borne Plant Diseases: Pierce’s Disease and the Blue-Green Sharpshooter in the Napa Valley," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103865, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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    More about this item


    Bargaining games; Bioeconomic Models; Cellular Automata; Computational Methods; Externality; Disease Control; Grapevine Leafroll Disease; Side payment; Spatial-Dynamic Processes; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C63; C71; C72;

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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