Non-use values and the management of transboundary renewable resources
It has long been recognized in economics that individuals can derive benefits from a resource stock without directly or indirectly utilizing that resource. Such non-use values, including existence values and bequest values, however, are often ignored in models of resource management. In this paper, a simple, two-country model of the management of a renewable resource is developed in which at least one country has a non-economic interest in the conservation of the fish stock to examine the impact of such a non-use value on the end-of-period harvest and self-enforcing sharing rule. The model shows that this non-lucrative pursuit serves to decrease the total allowable catch for each period at the expense of the catch share of the more conservation-oriented country, a result is consistent with the September 1995 decision by NAFO ending the dispute between Canada and the European Union over turbot.
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