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Singular optimal control model of stock dependent environmental policies

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  • K. Erdlenbruch

    (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - ENGREF - Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - CEMAGREF - Centre national du machinisme agricole, du génie rural, des eaux et forêts - IRD [France-Sud] - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement)

  • M. Tidball

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

In many countries, forest policies consist of a system of various regulations, taxes and subsidies. In this article, we focus on those policies that regulate selective harvesting and study the example of Central Africa. We use a deterministic singular optimal control model of renewable resources to assess these policies with respect to a first best situation which integrates a social surplus or externality function. In particular, in contrast to earlier articles, we analyze a stock dependent tax, for which the objective function is piecewise differentiable. We use a theorem proposed by Hartl and Feichtinger to solve the mathematical problem. We show that this tax is the most flexible instrument with respect to fund collection.

Suggested Citation

  • K. Erdlenbruch & M. Tidball, 2006. "Singular optimal control model of stock dependent environmental policies," Post-Print hal-00451685, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00451685
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-006-9130-8
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00451685
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