Local Monopsony Power in the Market for Broilers - Evidence from a Farm Survey
The exercise of monopsony power by broiler processing firms is plausible because production occurs within localized complexes, which limits the number of integrators with whom growers can contract. In addition, growers face distinct hold-up risks as broiler production requires a substantial investment in specific assets and most production contracts do not involve long-term purchasing commitments by integrators. This paper provides an initial exploration of the links between the local concentration of broiler integrators and grower compensation under production contracts using data from the 2006 broiler version of USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey. Results of this preliminary study, which accounts for characteristics of the operation and specific features of the production contract, suggest a small but economically meaningful effect of concentration on grower concentration. Limitations of the current analysis and future possible model extensions are discussed.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202|
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Azzam, Azzeddine M, 1997. "Measuring Market Power and Cost-Efficiency Effects of Industrial Concentration," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 377-86, December.
- Tomislav Vukina & Porametr Leegomonchai, 2006. "Oligopsony Power, Asset Specificity, and Hold-Up: Evidence from the Broiler Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(3), pages 589-605.
- James M. MacDonald & Charles R. Handy & Gerald E. Plato, 2002. "Competition and Prices in USDA Commodity Procurement," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 128-143, July.
- Morrison Paul, Catherine J., 2000.
"Cost Economies and Market Power: The Case of the U.S Meat Packing Industry,"
190897, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Catherine J. Morrison Paul, 2001. "Cost Economies And Market Power: The Case Of The U.S. Meat Packing Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 531-540, August.
- Muth, Mary K. & Wohlgenant, Michael K., 1999. "Measuring The Degree Of Oligopsony Power In The Beef Packing Industry In The Absence Of Marketing Input Quantity Data," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(02), December.
- Azzeddine Azzam, 1998. "Captive Supplies, Market Conduct, and the Open-Market Price," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(1), pages 76-83.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea08:6073. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.