Market Power And Off-Invoice Trade Promotions In The Us: An Empirical Investigation
This article employs a Tobit model to examine whether the market power of manufacturers and retailers influence trade promotion decisions in the US food sector. Greater retailer market power increases allocation of funds to off-invoice trade promotions. We find evidence that the balance of power favors food retailers.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Stephen F. Hamilton, 2003. "Slotting Allowances as a Facilitating Practice by Food Processors in Wholesale Grocery Markets: Profitability and Welfare Effects," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(4), pages 797-813.
- Nanda Kumar & Surendra Rajiv & Abel Jeuland, 2001. "Effectiveness of Trade Promotions: Analyzing the Determinants of Retail Pass Through," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(4), pages 382-404, August.
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