Does The Existence Of Market Power Affect Marketing Loan Programs?
The paper analyzes the effects that a demand with oligopsonistic power may have on the operation of a marketing loan program (especially on the program cost). We measure these effects using a model for the US peanut market where evidence indicates that the demand is highly concentrated. Our results show that the USDA strategy of keeping a repayment rate above the market-clearing price set by the demand is not a sustainable strategy, since the demand can follow a hand-to-mouth strategy, postponing its purchases of peanuts, letting USDA accumulate stocks and forcing it to reduce the price.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salanie, Bernard, 1991. "Wage and Price Adjustment in a Multimarket Disequilibrium Model," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(1), pages 1-15, Jan.-Marc.
- Westcott, Paul C. & Price, J. Michael, 2001. "Analysis Of The U.S. Commodity Loan Program With Marketing Loan Provisions," Agricultural Economics Reports 34035, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1974. "The Nature of Quantities in Market Disequilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 509-14, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea03:22241. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.