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Are Intra-Household Allocations Efficient?

Author

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  • Aguero, Jorge M.

Abstract

This paper describes two problems when testing the efficiency of intra-household allocations. First, using Monte Carlo simulations I show that the test proposed for efficiency in consumption has a high type-II error, leading to a false acceptance of the hypothesis. Second, I show it is possible that even under asymmetric information the hypothesis of efficiency, incorrectly, cannot be rejected. Finally, I propose a test to account for asymmetric of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Aguero, Jorge M., 2003. "Are Intra-Household Allocations Efficient?," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22061, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea03:22061
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22061
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 1993. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption: A Model and some Evidence from French Data," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 29, pages 137-156.
    6. Blundell, Richard & Meghir, Costas, 1987. "Bivariate alternatives to the Tobit model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 179-200.
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    Cited by:

    1. Denni Tommasi, 2016. "Household Responses to cash Transfers," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-20, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Anyck Dauphin & Abdel‐Rahmen El Lahga & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2011. "Are Children Decision‐Makers within the Household?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(553), pages 871-903, June.

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