Designing Green Programs To Protect Environmental Amenities: A Mechanism Design Approach
We evaluate the optimal design of programs to encourage the production of environmental amenities in agriculture using a mechanism design approach.
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- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995.
"Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information,"
Staff General Research Papers
843, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(02), December.
- JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 95-wp131, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
- Peterson, Jeffrey M. & Boisvert, Richard N., 1998. "Optimal Voluntary "Green" Payment Programs To Limit Nitrate Contamination Under Price and Yield Risk," Research Bulletins 122687, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Goodhue, Rachael E., 2002. "Public policy: Its many analytical dimensions," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 39, pages 2057-2102 Elsevier.
- Chambers, Robert G. & Quiggin, John, 1996. "Non-point-source pollution regulation as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 95-116, January.
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