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Designing Green Programs To Protect Environmental Amenities: A Mechanism Design Approach

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  • Goodhue, Rachael E.
  • Gruere, Guillaume P.
  • Klonsky, Karen

Abstract

We evaluate the optimal design of programs to encourage the production of environmental amenities in agriculture using a mechanism design approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhue, Rachael E. & Gruere, Guillaume P. & Klonsky, Karen, 2001. "Designing Green Programs To Protect Environmental Amenities: A Mechanism Design Approach," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20702, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20702
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 1-12, December.
    2. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    3. Peterson, Jeffrey M. & Boisvert, Richard N., 1998. "Optimal Voluntary "Green" Payment Programs To Limit Nitrate Contamination Under Price and Yield Risk," Research Bulletins 122687, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    4. Chambers, Robert G. & Quiggin, John, 1996. "Non-point-source pollution regulation as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 95-116, January.
    5. Rausser, Gordon C. & Goodhue, Rachael E., 2002. "Public policy: Its many analytical dimensions," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 39, pages 2057-2102, Elsevier.
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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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