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Command-And-Control Or Effluent Allowance Markets: Roles Of Economic Analysis

  • Speir, Cameron
  • Stephenson, Kurt
  • Shabman, Leonard A.

Economists and economic analysis can play different roles in the development of water quality management programs. Economists may develop cost analysis for improving regulatory program implementation or design institutional arrangements for market-like program. We argue that cost analysis may be incompatible with effective advocacy for market-like systems.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21869
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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL with number 21869.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea00:21869
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  1. Kling, Catherine L., 2004. "Emission Trading vs. Rigid Regulations in the Control of Vehicle Emissions," Staff General Research Papers 12333, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. O'Ryan, Raul E., 1996. "Cost-Effective Policies to Improve Urban Air Quality in Santiago, Chile," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 302-313, November.
  3. Foster, Vivien & Hahn, Robert W, 1995. "Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 19-48, April.
  4. Walter Hecq & Bruno Kestemont, 1991. "A Model of Emission Trading for Minimizing the Cost of Air Pollution Control from Belgian Power Plants," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/65346, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. Fred L. Smith, 1995. "Markets And The Environment: A Critical Reappraisal," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(1), pages 62-73, 01.
  6. Robert N. Stavins, 2007. "Environmental Economics," NBER Working Papers 13574, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Jaffe Adam B. & Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S43-S63, November.
  8. Boyd, James, 2000. "The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's Proposed TMDL Rules," Discussion Papers dp-00-12, Resources For the Future.
  9. Rubin Jonathan & Kling Catherine, 1993. "An Emission Saved Is an Emission Earned: An Empirical Study of Emission Banking for Light-Duty Vehicle Manufacturers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 257-274, November.
  10. Atkinson, Scott & Tietenberg, Tom, 1991. "Market failure in incentive-based regulation: The case of emissions trading," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 17-31, July.
  11. Israel M. Kirzner, 1997. "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 60-85, March.
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