Vertical Agreements Between Airports And Carriers
This paper investigates vertical contracts between airports and airlines, in the context of two competing facilities and three different types of agreements. The downstream market consists in a route operated by one leader and n-1 follower competing à la Stackelberg in each airport. In this sense, the paper adds to literature as it considers the issue of vertical contracts both in the airports competition and airlines competition. We develop a multistage facility-rivalry game where each airport and the respective dominant airline decide whether to enter into a contract and, if so, which one to engage in. In this framework, we investigate the Nash equilibrium to analyse the incentives for vertical contracts: we find that the airport and the dominant airline have incentive to collude in each facility. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is not efficient in terms of social welfare, so that there is a misalignment between private and social incentives
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
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- Basso, Leonardo J., 2008. "Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1015-1031, July.
- Zhang, Anming & Fu, Xiaowen & Yang, Hangjun (Gavin), 2010. "Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 44(8-9), pages 944-959, September.
- Starkie, David, 2002. "Airport regulation and competition," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 63-72.
- Marco Alderighi & Alessandro Cento & Peter Nijkamp & Piet Rietveld, 2005. "Network competition - the co-existence of hub-and-spoke and point-to-point," ERSA conference papers ersa05p703, European Regional Science Association.
- Barbot, Cristina, 2009. "Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(10), pages 952-965, December.
- David Starkie, 2008. "The Airport Industry in a Competitive Environment: A United Kingdom Perspective," OECD/ITF Joint Transport Research Centre Discussion Papers 2008/15, OECD Publishing.
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