Airportâ€“airline vertical relationships, their effects and regulatory policyÂ implications
This paper examines the forms and effects of vertical relationships between airports and airlines with a focus on the North American and European aviation markets. We find that such vertical relationships enables those participating to achieve various benefits and may be formed as a competitive response toÂ other competing airportâ€“airline alliances. In some cases, vertical airportâ€“airline relationships strengthen the hub status of major airports, leading to increased employment and service quality in local markets. On the other hand, preferential treatment of a particular airline by an airport may enhance that airlineâ€™s market power, allowing it to dominate the airport and charge hub premiums. The competition and welfare implications of airportâ€“airline vertical alliances can be complicated and two-sided, subject to the influences of other factors such as the market structures of the airline and airport markets.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 17 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-air-transport-management/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Xiaowen Fu & Anming Zhang, 2010. "Effects of Airport Concession Revenue Sharing on Airline Competition and Social Welfare," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 44(2), pages 119-138, May.
- Albers, Sascha & Koch, Benjamin & Ruff, Christine, 2005. "Strategic alliances between airlines and airportsâ€”theoretical assessment and practical evidence," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 49-58.
- Zhang, Anming & Fu, Xiaowen & Yang, Hangjun (Gavin), 2010. "Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 44(8-9), pages 944-959, September.
- Brueckner, Jan K. & Spiller, Pablo T., 1991. "Competition and mergers in airline networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 323-342, September.
- Pels, Eric & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 2003. "Access to and competition between airports: a case study for the San Francisco Bay area," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 71-83, January.
- Jia Yan & Xiaowen Fu & Tae Oum, 2008. "Exploring Network Effects of Point-to-Point Networks: An Investigation of the Spatial Entry Patterns of Southwest Airlines," Working Papers 2008-21, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Tae Hoon Oum & Xiaowen Fu & Mark Lijesen, 2005.
"An Analysis of Airport Pricing and Regulation in the Presence of Competition Between Full Service Airlines and Low Cost Carriers,"
CIRJE-F-316, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Xiaowen Fu & Mark Lijesen & Tae H. Oum, 2006. "An Analysis of Airport Pricing and Regulation in the Presence of Competition Between Full Service Airlines and Low Cost Carriers," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 40(3), pages 425-447, September.
- Cristina Barbot, 2009. "Vertical Contracts between Airports and Airlines: is there a Trade-off between Welfare and Competitiveness?," CEF.UP Working Papers 0901, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Darin Lee & María José Luengo-Prado, 2005. "The Impact of Passenger Mix on Reported “Hub Premiums” in the U.S. Airline Industry," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372–394, October.
- Martin Dresner & Robert Windle & Yuliang Yao, 2002. "Airport Barriers to Entry in the US," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 36(3), pages 389-405, September.
- Ken Hendricks & Michele Piccione & Guofu Tan, 1997. "Entry and Exit in Hub-Spoke Networks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 291-303, Summer.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
- Mara Lederman, 2008. "Are Frequent-Flyer Programs a Cause of the "Hub Premium"?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 35-66, 03.
- Lijesen, Mark G. & Rietveld, Piet & Nijkamp, Peter, 2001. "Hub premiums in European civil aviation," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 193-199, July.
- Gérard P. Cachon & Martin A. Lariviere, 2005. "Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 30-44, January.
- Severin Borenstein, 1989. "Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 344-365, Autumn.
- Windle, Robert & Dresner, Martin, 1999. "Competitive responses to low cost carrier entry," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 59-75, March.
- Button, Kenneth & Lall, Somik & Stough, Roger & Trice, Mark, 1999. "High-technology employment and hub airports," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 53-59.
- Barbot, Cristina, 2006. "Low-cost airlines, secondary airports, and state aid: An economic assessment of the Ryanairâ€“Charleroi Airport agreement," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 197-203.
- Barbot, Cristina, 2009. "Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(10), pages 952-965, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:17:y:2011:i:6:p:347-353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.