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Market structure, countervailing power and price discrimination: the case of airports

Author

Listed:
  • Haskel, J
  • Valletti, T
  • Iozzi, A

Abstract

A number of interesting policy questions have arisen regarding airport landing fees. For example, what is the impact of joint ownership of airports? Does airline countervailing power stop airports raising fees? Should airports be prohibited, as an EU directive intends, from charging differential input prices to airlines? We set out a model of upstream airports and downstream airlines with varying countervailing power and pricing structures. Our major findings are: (a) an increase in upstream concentration or in the degree of differentiation between airports always increases the landing fee; (b) the effect of countervailing power, via an increase in downstream concentration, lowers landing fees, but typically does not pass through to consumers; (c) with Cournot competition, uniform landing fees are always higher than discriminatory fees.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Haskel, J & Valletti, T & Iozzi, A, 2013. "Market structure, countervailing power and price discrimination: the case of airports," Working Papers 6857, Imperial College, London, Imperial College Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:imp:wpaper:6857
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    Cited by:

    1. Wiltshire, James, 2018. "Airport competition: Reality or myth?," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 241-248.
    2. Siu Kei Wong & Ling Li & Paavo Monkkonen, 2019. "How do Developers Price New Housing in a Highly Oligopolistic City?," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 22(3), pages 309-333.
    3. Zhang, Anming & Czerny, Achim I., 2012. "Airports and airlines economics and policy: An interpretive review of recent research," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 15-34.
    4. Pavlyuk, Dmitry, 2012. "Airport Benchmarking and Spatial Competition: a Critical Review," MPRA Paper 43391, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Andrey E. Shastitko & Natalya S. Pavlova, 2023. "Assessing the boundaries of the airport services market: Grounds for tariff deregulation," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 14(5), pages 2-15, November.
    6. Ricardo Flores‐Fillol & Alberto Iozzi & Tommaso Valletti, 2018. "Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 705-725, October.
    7. Kenneth Button, 2020. "Studying the empirical implications of the liberalization of airport markets," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 21(3), pages 223-243, September.
    8. Ho, Chun-Yu & McCarthy, Patrick & Wang, Yanhao, 2021. "Competition and countervailing power: Evidence from the China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines merger," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    9. Choo, Yap Yin & Corbo, Leonardo & Wang, Kun, 2018. "Joint impact of airline market structure and airport ownership on airport market power and profit margin," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 67-78.
    10. Lin, Ming Hsin & Mantin, Benny, 2015. "Airport privatization in international inter-hub and spoke networks," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 189-199.
    11. Álvarez-SanJaime, Óscar & Cantos-Sanchez, Pedro & Moner-Colonques, Rafael & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J., 2021. "The effect of cooperative infrastructure fees on high-speed rail and airline competition," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 125-141.
    12. Matsushima, Noriaki & Takauchi, Kazuhiro, 2014. "Port privatization in an international oligopoly," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 382-397.
    13. Álvarez-Sanjaime, Óscar & Cantos-Sánchez, Pedro & Moner-Colonques, Rafael & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J., 2020. "A three-stage competition game in an air transport network under asymmetric valuation of flight frequencies," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 21(C).
    14. Siu Kei Wong & Ling Li & Paavo Monkkonen, 2019. "How do Developers Price New Housing in a Highly Oligopolistic City?," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 22(3), pages 307-331.
    15. Jiang, Changmin & Zhang, Anming, 2015. "Airport congestion pricing and terminal investment: Effects of terminal congestion, passenger types, and concessionsAuthor-Name: Wan, Yulai," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-113.
    16. Hou, Shuhua & Zhang, Zhen & Peng, Jiaxin & Chen, Xin, 2025. "Multi-airport system management strategies considering air-rail intermodality and social welfare," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    17. Conti, Maurizio & Ferrara, Antonella Rita & Ferraresi, Massimiliano, 2019. "Did the EU Airport Charges Directive lead to lower aeronautical charges? Empirical evidence from a diff-in-diff research design," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 24-39.
    18. Akio Kawasaki, 2020. "Airport pricing strategy by hub airports: does the number of local airports matter?," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 835-857, October.
    19. Haskel, Jonathan & Iozzi, Alberto & Valletti, Tommaso, 2013. "Market structure, countervailing power and price discrimination: The case of airports," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 12-26.
    20. Anna Bottasso & Martina Bruno & Maurizio Conti & Claudio Piga, 2017. "Competition, vertical relationship and countervailing power in the UK airport industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 37-62, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

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