Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C70: General
/ / / C71: Cooperative Games
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games
/ / / C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
/ / / C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
/ / / C79: Other

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This JEL code is mentioned in the following RePEc Biblio entries:

1. Experimental Economics
2. International agreements

0

• FORGES, Françoise, 1992, "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1012, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80009-8.
• Marini, M., 1996, "Property rights and market: employee privatization as a cooperative bargaining process," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1252, Jan.
• FIGUIÈRES, Charles & VERDONCK, Magali, 2003, "On the core of an economy with multilateral and multidimensional environmental externalities," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1635, Jan.
• BOGOMOLNAIA, Anna & LE BRETON, Michel & SAVVATEEV, Alexei & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005, "The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1775, Jan.
• MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2006, "Proportionality and non-manipulability in bankruptcy problems," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1898, Jan, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000825.
• MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2007, "Erratum. Bankruptcy rules and coalitional manipulation [IGTR, 9(1), 105-118, 2007]," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2046, Jan, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001497.
• CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2009, "Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2092, Jan.
• BRECHET, Thierry & EYCKMANS, Johan & GERARD, François & MARBAIX, Philippe, 2010, "The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2217, Jan, DOI: 10.3763/cpol.2009.0643.
• GRANDJEAN, Gilles & MAULEON, Ana & VENNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2010, "A characterization of farsightedly stable networks," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2249, Jan, DOI: 10.3390/g1030226.
• HERINGS, Jean-Jacques P. & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2010, "Coalition formation among farsighted agents," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2250, Jan, DOI: 10.3390/g1030286.
• VERGOTE, Wouter, 2011, "Collusion in repeated auctions: a simple dynamic mechanism," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2294, Jan.
• BOUCEKKINE, Raouf & KRAWCZYK, Jacek B. & VALLEE, Thomas, 2010, "Towards an understanding of tradeoffs between regional wealth, tightness of a common environmental constraint and the sharing rules," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2332, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2010.02.004.
• MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013, "Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2482, Jan, DOI: 10.3390/g4030329.
• Jean J. Gabszewicz & Marco A. Marini & Ornella Tarola, 2019, "Endogenous mergers in markets with vertically differentiated products," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3051, Jan.
• FORGES, Françoise, 1990, "Repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 933, Jan.
• FORGES, Françoise, 1991, "Sunspot eqilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 952, Jan.
• David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, , "Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution, number 001.
• Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, , "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution, number 032.
• Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, , "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution, number 040.
• Dorothea Alewell & Wiebke Kuklys & Colette Friedrich & Werner Güth, , "Fair Wages and the Co-Employment of Hired and Rented Hands - An Experimental Study," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2005-08.
• Joan Esteban & Sabine Flamand & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2018, "A Dynamic Theory of Secession," HiCN Working Papers, Households in Conflict Network, number 276, Sep.
• Sudipta Sarangi & Aditi Roy, 2009, "Revisiting Friendship Networks," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, number 2009-12, Dec.
• Alex Possajennikov, 2008, "Commitment in Symmetric Contests," Discussion Papers, University of Nottingham, School of Economics, number 08/13.
• David P Myatt & Chris Wallace, , "Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number W31..
• Leigh S. Tesfatsion, , "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game with Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996, Society for Computational Economics, number _057.
• David McFadzean & Leigh Tesfatsion, , "An Agent-Based Computational Model for the Evolution of Trade Networks," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997, Society for Computational Economics, number 110.
• Plantin, Guillaume & Shin, Hyun Song, 2018, "Exchange rates and monetary spillovers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019, "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 2, May.
• Chiappori, Pierre-André & Gugl, Elisabeth, 2020, "Transferable utility and demand functions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 4, November.
• Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023, "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Candogan, Ozan & Strack, Philipp, 2023, "Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023, ""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Agrawal, David R. & Bagh, Adib & Mardan, Mohammed, 2025, "Sensitivity versus size: implications for tax competition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 3, July.
• Pęski, Marcin, 2025, "Random utility coordination games on networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L., 2026, "Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 21, issue 1, January.
• Kartik, Navin & Zhong, Weijie, 2026, "Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 21, issue 1, January.
• Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, , "Environmental Innovation, War of Attrition and Investment Grants," Working Papers, University of Brescia, Department of Economics, number ubs0406.
• David Dickinson, , "Dispute resolution with combined arbitration," Working Papers, Utah State University, Department of Economics, number 2001-02.
• David Dickinson, , "A comparison of conventional, final offer, and combined arbitration for dispute resolution," Working Papers, Utah State University, Department of Economics, number 2001-04.
• Roger D. Lagunoff, , ""Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number 95-07.
• Richard Manning & Julian Manning, , ""Budget-constrained Search''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number 95-09.
• Johannes Hörner, , ""Reputation and Competition''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number 99-02.
• Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, , "All-pay aspects of decision making under public scrutiny," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 11/27.
• Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 004.
• Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, , "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 006.
• Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 020.
• Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, , "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 038.
• Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, , "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 052.
• Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, , "Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 055.
• Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 072.
• Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 075.
• Armin Falk, , "Homo Oeconomicus Versus Homo Reciprocans: Ans�tze f�r ein Neues Wirtschaftspolitisches Leitbild?," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 079.
• Aleksander Berentsen & Yvan Lengwiler, , "Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 175.
• Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 179.
• Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 191.
• Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, , "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 193.
• Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 224.
• Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, , "The Hidden Costs of Control," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 250.

None

• Banerji A. & Meenakshi J.V., 2008, "Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-27, February, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1786.
• Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2001, "Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-39, October, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1000.
• Gelman Andrew, 2003, "Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 2, issue 1, pages 1-14, October, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1185.
• Ingraham Allan T, 2005, "A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-32, September, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1448.
• Leoni Patrick L, 2009, "A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-20, January, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1462.
• Bendor Jonathan & Mookherjee Dilip & Ray Debraj, 2001, "Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 1, issue 1, pages 1-44, March, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1008.
• Evans Robert, 2003, "A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-8, January, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1066.
• Ponsati Clara, 2004, "Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-27, February, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1099.
• Prasad Kislaya, 2003, "Non-robustness of some economic models," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-9, May, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1082.
• Zhang Qinghua, 2004, "Multiple-Object Auctions Around a Circle," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-20, February, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1120.
• Dutta Jayasri & Prasad Kislaya, 2004, "Imitation and Long Run Outcomes," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 4, issue 1, pages 1-36, October, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1163.
• Courtney Dennis & Marschak Thomas, 2006, "Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 6, issue 1, pages 1-36, December, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1311.