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Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders

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  • Ponsati Clara

    () (Institut d’Analisi Economica - CSIC)

Abstract

We study decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. In the first part of the paper we characterize equilibrium in a bargaining model with two-sided time varying outside options. In the second part we analyze a market equilibrium model in which (i) buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs; (ii) each buyer-seller pair bargains over the price of a good; and (iii) each agent has the option of abandoning negotiations, in which case the value of returning to the pool of unmatched agents constitutes an outside option. The second part is therefore an application of the first part in which the values of the outside options are endogenous to the model. Conditions for uniqueness of the market equilibrium are given; when it is unique it converges to the Walrasian outcome as frictions vanish. To the extent that multiplicity of market equilibria may (under some conditions) persist as frictions are removed, the limit of some sequences of equilibrium prices may converge to non-Walrasian values.

Suggested Citation

  • Ponsati Clara, 2004. "Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. JÕzsef SÂkovics & Clara PonsatÎ, 1998. "Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 667-672.
    2. Gale,Douglas, 2000. "Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644105, March.
    3. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
    4. Ponsati, C. & sakovics, J., 1996. "Bargaining in a changing Environment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 351.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-399, March.
    6. Clara Ponsatí & József Sákovics, 2001. "Randomly available outside options in bargaining," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 231-252.
    7. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78.
    8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Helmut Bester, 1988. "Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 201-214.
    10. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "Sequential Bargaining and Competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 353-363, April.
    11. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    12. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nadia Burani & Clara Ponsati, 2011. "Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 91-120, June.
    2. Annen, Kurt, 2006. "Social Capital in the Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries – Micro Evidence from Small Textile Producers in Bolivia," Documentos de trabajo 3/2006, Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas (IISEC), Universidad Católica Boliviana.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium

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